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ABSTRACT 
In the philosophical literature on the definition of  lying, the analysis is generally restricted to 
cases of  flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of  lies involving 
partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section 
analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief  in the falsity of  the assertion, and presents 
a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely 
to be false than true. The second section analyses assertions that express graded beliefs, 
exploring how mitigation and reinforcement can alter the insincerity conditions for lying. The 
last section considers the case of  lies that attack certainty (knowledge-lies), understood as 
attempts to alter the hearer’s graded beliefs. 
Introduction 
A prominent characteristic of  lies is that they come in a variety of  forms and kinds, and this is 
part of  what makes them elusive and difficult to identify. As Montaigne nicely stated, while 
truth is unique, “the opposite of  truth has many shapes, and an indefinite field” (Montaigne 
E:1.IX). One of  the ambitions of  this book is to categorise these different shapes, and to 
provide systematic criteria to distinguish lies from other utterances.  
This can be a hard challenge, and indeed for a theory of  lying “the more difficult task [is] that 
of  drawing lines” (Bok 1989:49). There is a whole grey area of  deceptive utterances that are 
difficult to classify (for instance, the so-called “half-truths”) and, quite importantly, it is in this 
grey zone that liars strive. To shed some light in this obscure area, this chapter will consider 
the problem of  classifying statements that are not fully believed to be false, but that are 
nevertheless not believed to be true. Are these statements lies? And how much confidence in 
their falsity is required for them to count as lies? We will focus on such questions, exploring 
the thin, elusive line that distinguishes a sincere assertion from an insincere one. 
On a standard view, an utterance is a lie only if  (1) it is an assertion and (2) the speaker believes 
it to be false . However, the expression “believe to be false” is not really helpful to deal with 1
intermediate cases, as it does not specify which degree of  confidence in the falsity of  p counts 
as believing to be false. As we analyse this issue, we will see that lies are difficult to categorise 
because lying is often a matter of  degree (Bazzanella 2009, Isenberg 1964:470). This is not 
because lying is a scalar predicate (one cannot say that p is more of  a lie than q), but rather 
because being sincere is: a speaker can be more or less sincere – so that, indirectly, a lie can be 
a more or less severe violation of  the linguistic (and moral) norm of  sincerity.  
1. Speaker certainty 
1.1.	 Certainty, uncertainty and graded beliefs  
In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes 
Benjamin Franklin (1789) 
What is certainty? Most authors agree that it is a kind of  attitude that a subject can have 
towards a proposition. More specifically, certainty (or what philosophers call ‘psychological’ 
certainty ) can be defined as the highest degree of  confidence that a subject can have in the truth of  2
a proposition. Thus understood, certainty is always relative to someone’s standpoint: it does not 
matter if  the subject has no ground (or bad grounds) for holding that belief, because certainty 
only requires that the subject be supremely convinced of  its truth.  
This conception of  certainty, defined as the highest degree of  belief  a speaker can have in a 
proposition, presupposes that believing comes in degrees – and that there are degrees of  
belief  lower than certainty. That beliefs can be graded is evident if  one thinks about daily 
situations in which a subject lacks certainty in a proposition that he nonetheless, to some 
extent, believes. Too see this, consider some examples: suppose Groucho believes that (i) he 
 Some authors require a further condition: that the speaker intends to deceive the hearer (e.g. Mannison 1969: 1
132; Kupfer 1982:134; Williams 2002:96). For the purpose of  this chapter, I will assume that while prototypical 
lies are intended to deceive, this intention is not a necessary condition for lying.
 Philosophers often distinguish psychological certainty from epistemic certainty (Klein 1998, Reid 2008, Stainley 2
2008). Epistemic certainty refers to the degree of  epistemic warrant that a proposition has, independently of  the 
speaker’s confidence in it (i.e. independently of  psychological certainty). While psychological certainty is purely 
‘subjective’ (it only depends on the subject’s confidence), epistemic certainty is in a sense ‘objective’ (it depends 
on the actual solidity of  the subject’s reasons to believe in that proposition). The literature on lying is generally 
concerned with psychological certainty, since the strength of  the speaker’s grounds for disbelieving an assertion is 
irrelevant to assess whether he is insincere or not. Consequently, in this chapter, “certainty” (and “uncertainty”) 
will refer to psychological certainty (and uncertainty).
has a pair of  moustaches, (ii) Bulgaria will beat Azerbaijan in their next football match, and 
(iii) there is life on some other planet in the universe. Groucho regards (i) as certain, (ii) as 
probable, (iii) as merely more likely true than not.  
Groucho neither fully believes nor fully disbelieves (ii) or (iii). These intermediate, partial 
beliefs (believing to be probable, believing to be unlikely, etc.) are called in the literature 
“graded beliefs”, because they can be ordered in a graded scale : Groucho is more confident 3
in the truth of  (i) than he is in (ii), and in (ii) than he is in (iii). Formal accounts of  degrees of  
belief  (namely Bayesian accounts) represent this scale with real numbers from 0 to 1, where 0 
indicates certainty in the falsity of  p, 1 indicates certainty in the truth of  p, and 0.5 indicates 
uncertainty (cases in which the subject regards p as just as likely to be true as to be false). On 
this view, uncertainty is the middle point (0.5) of  a continuum of  degrees of  belief  whose 
poles are certainty in falsity (0) and in truth (1) of  the proposition (see Figure 1). To provide a 
formal account of  the previous example, one could say that Groucho has degree of  belief  of  
1 in (i), of  0.75 in (ii), of  0.51 in (iii).  
!  
Figure 1: A visual representation of  the certainty-uncertainty continuum 
Any account of  sincerity that takes into consideration this wide array of  graded beliefs will 
have to explain how they relate to the boundaries of  the concept of  lying. For instance, 
suppose that Groucho states that Bulgaria will beat Azerbaijan while believing that it is 
probably false, or as likely to be false as true. Would these utterances be sincere or insincere? 
And more generally, how are we to draw the boundary between sincere and insincere 
utterances, and (consequently) between lies and not lies?  
1.2.	 Insincerity and (un)certainty  
What constitutes the essence of  lying, 
if  not saying what you don’t have in your heart? 
Rosmini, Apologetica, 7-131 
 For a discussion of  the mutual relations between flat-out beliefs and graded beliefs, see Frankish (2009).3
A necessary condition for lying is that the speaker utters an insincere statement. There are 
several ways to define insincerity. In a general sense, insincerity refers to a discrepancy between the 
psychological state of  the speaker (e.g. believing, intending, desiring) and the psychological state expressed 
by his linguistic action (e.g. asserting, promising, requiring) (Falkenberg 1988:94, Searle & 
Vanderveken 2005:111). Defining ‘insincerity’ amounts to defining the nature of  this 
discrepancy. 
Limiting the present discussion to assertion , and accepting the standard view that assertions 4
express beliefs (Searle 1969: 65), this chapter will analyse insincerity as a discrepancy between 
what is asserted and what is believed by the speaker. Once graded beliefs are taken into account, 
the main challenge is to define how large this discrepancy has to be for a statement to count 
as insincere – and hence as a lie.  
In the philosophical literature, this challenge is generally overlooked or ignored. It is taken as 
an uncontroversial claim that a statement is sincere when the speaker believes it to be true, and 
insincere when the speaker believes it to be false , and that a more fine-grained analysis would 5
be unnecessarily intricate (Saul 2012:5, fn10). The standard “insincerity condition” for lying 
(IC) is generally phrased as follows:   
IC = S believes p to be false 
This condition correctly accounts for prototypical cases of  lying, but is ill-suited to consider 
cases of  uncertainty and graded beliefs. Since graded beliefs and uncertainty are ordinary 
psychological states, it seems that a theory of  lying should account for them (Meibauer 2014: 
223, D’Agostini 2012:41, Isenberg 1964: 468). 
To see that the standard account of  insincerity struggles to handle graded beliefs in a 
satisfactory way, consider the following example, inspired by historical events (cf. Carson 
 Arguably, assertion is not the only speech act that can be used to lie. However, it seems that non-assertive 4
speech acts can be used to lie only insofar as they entail an assertion (see Marsili 2016), so that an analysis of  
assertion is sufficient for our purposes.  I am here referring to illocutionary entailment (Searle & Vanderveken 
1985:130), where F1 illocutionary entails F2 iff  a speaker cannot perform F1 without also performing F2 (e.g. you 
cannot promise that you will p without also asserting that you will p).
 A third option is that the speaker has no opinion about p (he lacks a credal state about p); I will come back on this in 5
the next section. 
2010:212-21): George is a political leader, and tells (1) to a journalist. Propositions (a), (b), and 
(c) indicate George’s degree of  confidence in his utterance, in three possible scenarios . 6
(1) Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
(a) (1/¬p)         [Iraq has certainly no weapons of  mass destruction] 
(b)  (0.75/p)     [Probably, Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction] 
(c) (0.75/¬p)   [Probably, Iraq does not have weapons of  mass destruction] 
Scenario (1a) is a clear-cut case of  lying, since George believes (1) to be certainly false: the 
standard account correctly tracks the intuition that this is a lie. In (1b), by contrast, George 
believes the statement to be probably true: even if  he is not completely confident that the 
statement is true, it seems that in this case he is not lying (Austin 1946:65). The utterance is 
inaccurate, and perhaps misleading, because it misrepresents George’s degree of  belief  in (1). 
However, being inaccurate or misleading is clearly not the same as lying (Saul 2012, Stokke 
2013): condition IC is again on the right track, since it predicts that this utterance is not a lie. 
Problems arise for scenario (1c), where George believes (1) to be probably false. It seems that 
condition IC does not count it as a lie, because George does not utterly believe (1) to be false . 7
However, intuitively this is a case of  lying, because George is saying something he believes to 
be very likely false. Since it excludes this sort of  cases, (IC) is too narrow, and needs some 
refinement. 
Cases like (1b,c) suggests that a more fine-grained account of  lying is needed, one that 
appreciates how lying can involve graded beliefs. Such a definition of  lying should offer an 
account of  what we might call ‘graded-belief  lies’: statements that are not outrightly believed to 
be false (nor true), but are nonetheless lies. The next section will review a few attempts to 
revise the definition of  lying in this direction . 8
 Assigning a defined, numeric degree of  belief  to these linguistic expressions (e.g “probably”, “perhaps”) merely 6
aims to indicate how these expressions can be ordered on a scale that goes from certainty to doubt (Holmes 
1982, Levinson 1983:134, Hoye 1997). Only their reciprocal relation in the scale matters to the present 
discussion – the accuracy of  the numeric values is not important. 
 To save (IC) against this objection, a partisan of  the standard view might suggest to interpret (IC) in a non-7
literal sense, so that (2) counts as a case of  believing p to be false, and hence as lying. However, this broad 
interpretation would open the problem of  which intermediate credal states count as believing false and which do 
not. Since this is exactly the problem that the sincerity condition should solve, (IC) would still be an unattractive 
option to settle the issue.
 Further complications for a definition of  insincerity, such as cases of  self-deception (in which the speaker is 8
mistaken about his own beliefs or mental states, cf. Moran 2005, Erikssonn 2011, Chan & Kakane 2011, Stokke 
2014) and malapropism (in which the speaker is mistaken about what he said, cf. Reimer 2004, Sorensen 2011, 
Saul 2012:15-9) will not be discussed here; for our purposes, to deal with these cases it is sufficient to require that 
the speaker satisfy (any version of) the insincerity conditions for lying advertently.
1.3. 	 Degrees of  (dis)believing 
Carson (2006: 298) has offered a definition of  lying that captures graded-belief  lies. His 
proposal presents a strong and a weak version of  the “insincerity condition” for lying. The 
first, “strong” version requires that the speaker believe his assertion to be “false or probably 
false”. Let us call Carson’s first condition the “strong insincerity condition” for lying: 
SIC= S believes p to be at least probably false  9
SIC correctly captures prototypical cases of  lying like (1a). Unlike the traditional definition, it 
also includes lies that are not believed with certainty to be false, like (1c), that George believes 
to be probably false. This is an advantage of  SIC over IC, since it seems intuitive that saying 
what you believe to be probably false counts as lying – even if  it is arguably less insincere, and 
less deceptive, than a full-fledged lie. 
However, it is not clear that the boundary between sincerity and insincerity lies exactly on the 
degree of  confidence indicated by ‘probably’, and not on another. The term ‘probably’ 
indicates a degree of  confidence in the truth (or falsity) of  the proposition higher than 
uncertainty and lower than certainty: for the sake of  the argument, let us assume it stands for 
a degree of  belief  of  0.75. If  a degree of  belief  of  0.75 in the falsity of  the proposition is 
enough for lying, there seems to be no reason to exclude lower graded beliefs like 0.7, or 0.6, 
that are perceivably higher than uncertainty (0.5). To see this, consider the following 
scenarios: 
(1) Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
(c) (0.75/¬p)   [Probably Iraq does not have weapons of  mass destruction] 
(d)  (0.6/¬p) [Presumably Iraq does not have weapons of  mass destruction] 
In (1d), George utters what he believes to be more likely to be false than true, so that it seems that 
he is lying. However, SIC does not capture (1d), because by hypothesis George’s degree of  
confidence is higher than uncertainty but falls short of  believing (1) to be probably false. Since 
it fails to account for the intuition that also (1d) is a lie (even if  arguably less insincere than 
(1c)), SIC is too restrictive.  
 I rephrased Carson’s condition to avoid the counterintuitive consequence that degrees of  belief  included 9
between “believing false” and “believing probably false” would not be counted as lies.
Carson’s second, “weak” proposal avoids this problem. The “weak insincerity condition” 
posits that lying requires that the speaker “does not believe [the asserted proposition] to be 
true” (Carson 2006, cf. also Sorensen 2007:256, 2011:407). 
WIC: S does not believe p to be true 
Since it acknowledges that utterances like (1d) are lies, WIC is preferable to SIC. However, 
WIC is too broad: it incorrectly captures cases in which the speaker has no idea whether what 
he says is true or false, but goes on saying it for some other reasons. These cases are classified 
in the literature as bullshit (Frankfurt 1986). The typical example of  bullshitter is the 
politician who “never yet considered whether any proposition were true or false, but whether 
it were convenient for the present minute or company to affirm or deny it” (Swift 1710). Now, 
as long as the speaker has no opinion about the veracity of  what he is saying, his utterance is 
better classified as a misleading utterance than as a lie (Saul 2012:20, Meibauer 2014: 103, 
but cf. Falkenberg 1988:93, Carson 2010:61-2) and WIC is too broad to account for this 
intuition. 
Given that SIC is too narrow and WIC is too broad, an ideal condition has to lie somewhere 
in the middle. Marsili (2014:162) proposes a middle ground between these two proposals: on 
this view, lying requires that the speaker believes p more likely to be false than true. Call this the 
comparative insincerity condition: 
CIC: S believes p more likely to be false than true 
Unlike WIC, CIC correctly rules out bullshit and statements uttered in cases of  uncertainty. 
Unlike IC, it counts graded-belief  lies as lies. And unlike SIC, it rules in the other cases in 
which the speaker does not believe the statement to be true – like (1c) and (1d).  
A possible worry about the CIC is that it implicitly accepts that every belief  can be 
represented as an assessment of  probability, and that the speaker would find any such 
difference to be significant. To avoid this worry, CIC can be revised into CIC*: 
CIC’: S’s degree of  confidence in ¬p is stronger than his degree of  confidence in p 
Of  course, it is possible to challenge the very assumption that there is a clear-cut boundary 
between insincerity and sincerity, so that we should allow for intermediate indeterminate 
cases (thereby treating insincerity and lying as vague predicates, see Isenberg 1964:470). But 
this intuition can be accommodated by the CIC which, unlike the other accounts, allows for a 
progressive transition from sincerity to insincerity. At the same time, if  a neat point of  
transition is to be individuated, the CIC is fine-grained enough to identify a boundary that 
meets our intuitions and avoids the counterexamples to which the alternative accounts fall 
victim . 10
 The proposed view correctly accounts for assertions that do not specify the speaker’s degree 
of  belief  in the truth of  the proposition (i.e., assertions that do not express graded beliefs): the 
next section will extend this view, and provide a broader framework to also treat assertions 
that express graded beliefs. 
2. Insincerely expressing a graded belief  
An assertion is insincere if  there is a significant discrepancy between the speaker’s degree of  belief  
(henceforth BΨ) and the degree of  belief  expressed by the sentence (henceforth BΛ). The previous 
section has shown that this discrepancy can come in degrees, because of  the graded nature of  
certainty – i.e. the graded nature of  BΨ. A complete explanation of  insincerity needs to 
account for the other side of  the coin: the different degrees of  belief  that an assertion can 
express – the graded nature of  BΛ. 
Assertions that express graded beliefs are generally overlooked in the literature on lying. This 
is because, in standard cases, statements express a flat-out belief  in the truth of  the 
proposition, rather than a graded belief. For instance, (1) expresses a flat-out belief  in the 
asserted proposition: 
(1) Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
Not all statements, however, are as simple as (1), for some express graded beliefs. For instance, 
in (1e) the speaker believes that (1) is probably true, and in (1f) he expresses uncertainty in the 
truth of  the proposition: 
(1e) (0.75/p) Probably Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
(1f) (0.5/p) Maybe Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
 Note that this blocks counterexamples based on borderline cases of  uncertainty (see Krauss 2017). Krauss has 10
proposed an alternative condition to CIC, that has been proven to be untenable by Benton (2018). 
Now, the previous section has considered graded-belief  lies, in which BΨ is graded. Graded 
assertions like (1e) and (1f), by contrast, are cases in which BΛ is graded. Three kind of  
graded-belief  lies are hence possible: (A) BΨ-graded: plain assertions like (1), uttered while 
holding a graded belief; (B) BΛ-graded: assertions expressing a graded belief, like (1e) and (1f), 
uttered while holding an outright belief; (C) complex cases, where both BΛ and BΨ are graded. 
In what follows, I will consider how the insincerity condition applies to cases (B) and (C), and 
discuss the difference between mitigating and reinforcing an assertion. 
2.1. 	 Two directions of  belief  misrepresentation 
Few authors have raised the question how assertions that express graded beliefs are to be 
analysed within a theory of  lying. Meibauer (2014: 225) suggests that there are three kinds of  
BΛ-graded assertions that may qualify as lies: those “(i) expressing certainty when [you] are 
uncertain, those (ii) expressing uncertainty when [you] are certain, and those (iii) expressing 
certainty or uncertainty to a higher degree than being adequate with respect with [your] 
knowledge base”. Since the third case seems to include the previous two, to simplify this 
taxonomy I will simply distinguish between two “directions” in misrepresenting your degree 
of  belief: namely, pretending to have a higher degree of  belief  or a lower degree of  belief than the 
one you have (cf. Falkenberg 1988:93). 
A first, tempting idea is to assume that these two directions are equivalent. This would mean 
that, from the point of  view of  the analysis of  lying, “pretending to be more certain than you 
are” is as insincere as “pretending to be less certain than you are” (Schiffrin 2014:12n15). A 
reason to make this assumption is that the “discrepancy” between your state of  mind and the 
state of  mind expressed by the statement is the same in both cases. However, at a closer look 
this assumption reveals to be naïve, as the first case (overstating) is often perceived as being 
more insincere, or more misleading, than the second (understating). To see this, imagine two 
utterances: 
(1g) (1/p) Certainly Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
(1h) (0.5/p) Perhaps Iraq has weapons of  mass destruction 
	  
Imagine that in both cases George’s mental state is in between certainty and uncertainty, so 
that he believes:  
	 (0.75/p) [Probably Iraq has weapon of  mass destruction] 
According to the ‘naïve’ view, (1g) and (1h) are equally insincere, because the discrepancy 
between BΨ and BΛ is the same (0.25). These scenarios differ only in the direction of  
misrepresentation: (1g) represents the speaker as having a higher degree of  belief  than he has, 
while (1h) as having a lower degree of  belief. Interestingly, however, it is natural to assess (1g) 
as more insincere than (1h). The reason is that we tend to judge (1h) as a prudent statement, 
that cooperatively avoids saying more than the speaker knows, while (1g) is perceived a 
misleading overstatement, that the speaker lacks sufficient knowledge to assert. In other 
words, ceteris paribus, understating your degree of  belief  is generally seen as a cooperative 
linguistic practice, while overstating it is generally regarded as uncooperative. 
In line with this intuition, Falkenberg (1988: 94, 1990) proposes to distinguish between “hard 
lies” (overstatements, like (1g)) and “soft lies” (understatements, like (1h)). However, this 
taxonomy is misleading in two respects. First, not all overstatements and understatements are 
lies: if  the CIC is a condition for lying, only statements displaying a certain level of  
discrepancy between BΨ and BΛ can be  lies. Second, it is not clear if  an overstatement (hard 
lie) is necessarily more of  a lie than an understatement (soft lie): next section will show that the 
direction of  misrepresentation is just one of  the parameters of  intensity that must be 
considered, another one being the discrepancy between BΨ and BΛ.  
2.2. 	 Epistemic modality markers and degrees of  commitment 
There is a vast literature exploring the various ways in which an assertion can be mitigated 
(expressing a lower degree of  belief, as in (1g)) or reinforced (expressing a higher degree of  
belief, as in (1h)) (see Fraser 1980, Holmes 1984, Coates 1987, Bazzanella et al. 1991, Caffi 
2007, Egan & Weatherson 2011). The most prominent linguistic devices used for these 
purposes (expression like ‘certainly’,’probably’, ‘perhaps’) are called epistemic modals. This 
section will explain their pragmatic function, and clarify why we generally assess understatements 
as more sincere (or more honest) than overstatements. 
Epistemic modals both “indicate the speaker’s confidence or lack of  confidence in the truth of  the 
proposition expressed” and “qualify [his] commitment to the truth of  the proposition expressed in 
[his] utterance” (Coates 1987:112, italic is mine). In other words, they act on two components 
of  the assertion, altering both (1) the psychological state expressed by the speaker (the degree 
of  belief), and (2) his degree of  commitment to the truth of  the proposition (the illocutionary 
strength ) (cf. Sbisà & Labinaz 2014:52, Lyons 1977: 793-809; Holmes 1984: 349). 11
These two functions are distinct in nature, but are entangled: if  a speaker S mitigates (or 
reinforces) the degree of  belief  conveyed by his assertion, then S automatically mitigates (or 
reinforces) the illocutionary force of  his assertion (that is, the degree of  his commitment to the 
truth of  the proposition). For instance, if  you state (2b) instead of  plainly stating (2), you both 
mitigate the degree of  belief  expressed ((2b) expresses uncertainty in (2)) and the degree of  
your commitment to the truth of  the asserted proposition (you are committed to the truth of  
(2) to a much lower degree if  you utter (2b)) . 12
(2) Plato will quit smoking tomorrow 
(2b) Perhaps Plato will quit smoking tomorrow 
The role that epistemic modals play in reinforcing/weakening the illocutionary force of  
assertions explains why understatements are perceived as more honest than overstatements. Ceteris 
paribus (given the same degree of  insincerity, like in (1g)-(1h)) a reinforced assertion has a 
stronger illocutionary force than a mitigated assertion, so that the speaker has a stronger 
commitment to its truth. And if  the commitment to sincerity is stronger in reinforced 
statements, then violating that commitment is more serious in that statements than in 
mitigated ones. 
Variations in illocutionary force induced by epistemic modals can also affect whether the 
speaker is asserting the proposition or not – and hence whether he is lying, because lying 
requires asserting. This is because epistemic modals can downgrade the degree of  
 In speech act theory, the illocutionary force is what characterises the utterance of  p as being the occurrence of  11
a specific kind of  illocutionary act (e.g. a question, an assertion, etc.). The illocutionary force of  an assertion can 
be reinforced or mitigated (Bazzanella, Caffi & Sbisà 1991; Sbisà 2000; Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 99), thus 
altering the speaker’s degree of  commitment to the truth of  the proposition.
 On this ‘espressivist’ interpretation, epistemic modals are not part of  the proposition asserted (at least not of  the 12
proposition against which speaker sincerity and commitment is assessed). A ‘descriptivist’ might object that we 
should instead take them to be part of  the content of  the assertion (and hence of  the proposition against which 
sincerity is measured). However, this would often yield counterintuitive predictions for the sincerity conditions of  
assertions. For instance, on a descriptive interpretation of  “certainly p” as true iff   (q): “the speaker is certain that 
p”, a speaker that believes that there are 9/10 chances that p is true would counterintuitively be counted as 
insincere (as S would be certain that q is false). It should be noted that even if  this section provides sincerity 
conditions for marked assertions interpreted in an expressivist fashion, it is not committed to expressivism: a 
descriptivist can still adopt the model proposed in section 1 (CIC). I follow Coates’ (1987:130) view that 
epistemic modals can be appropriately used and interpreted in both ways. When they are used ‘literally’ to assert 
the epistemic or psychological (un)certainty of  a proposition (rather than express that the proposition asserted is 
(un)certain, the simple sincerity conditions provided by CIC will apply; in the other cases (that I take to be the 
prevalent uses), the expressivist explanation outlined in this section will apply instead.  On the debate over the 
semantics of  epistemic modals, cf. Kratzer (1981), DeRose (1991), Egan, Hawtorne & Weatherson (2005), 
Papafragou (2006), Fintel & Gillies (2008), Yalcin (2007, 2011), Swanson (2011).
illocutionary force of  a declarative sentence to such an extent that it longer counts as an 
assertion, but rather as a supposition or an hypothesis (Sbisà & Labinaz 2014:52-3). For 
instance, (2b) is a supposition rather than an assertion: its insincere utterance does not amount 
to lying, while insincerely uttering its unmitigated version (2) does. Carson (2010: 33,38) 
shares this intuition: “there are weaker and stronger ways of  warranting the truth of  a 
statement. To count as a lie, a statement must be warranted to a certain minimum degree”. 
This is even more evident in other speech acts. For instance, if  Matteo utters (3b) instead of  
(3), it is clear that he has not promised that he will buy you an elephant (he is merely 
suggesting it), while he would be promising it if  he uttered (3). It seems that an insincere 
utterance of  the first amounts to lying, while this is not true for the second .  13
(3) Tomorrow I will buy you an elephant 
(3b) Perhaps tomorrow I will buy you an elephant 
To sum up, this section considered how to account for assertions of  type (ii), expressing 
graded beliefs (BΛ-graded lies), and (iii), complex cases where both BΛ and BΨ are graded. 
Both cases could have been dealt simply by appealing to condition CIC, but such an 
explanation would not have been able to account for differences determined by the direction 
of  misrepresentation (overstatements vs understatements). This difficulty dissipates once it is 
understood that epistemic modals influence not only whether the sincerity condition is 
satisfied (by altering the degree of  belief  expressed), but also whether the assertion condition 
is satisfied (by altering the speaker’s degree of  commitment).  This clarifies why Falkenberg’s 
characterisation of  overstatements and understatements as “hard” and “soft” lies is 
misleading: first, assertions that represent the speaker as less certain than he is 
(understatements) can be “hard” lies, if  they achieve a sufficient degree of  illocutionary force 
and insincerity; second, not all understatements and overstatements are lies, because they 
both may fail to achieve the sincerity and/or assertion condition for lying.  
 One might wonder whether uttering (2b) or (3b) while being psychologically certain that the mitigated 13
proposition is false would count as lying – i.e. if  a high degree of  insincerity can compensate for a low degree of  
commitment. Marsili (2014: 166-8) argues against this view, claiming that these utterances are to be classified as 
misleading statements rather than lies. 
3. Lies that attack certainty. 
So far, this chapter has focused on speaker certainty. This last section will consider hearer 
certainty, and how lies can affect the hearer’s degree of  belief  in the asserted proposition. The 
primary goal of  lying is generally to attack a hearer’s beliefs (or his grounds for believing): 
typically, to make the hearer believe that the asserted proposition is true, i.e. to deceive him. 
Traditionally, this intention to deceive was believed to be necessary for lying, but recently, on 
the grounds of  several convincing arguments (e.g. Carson 2006, Sorensen 2007, Fallis 2010, 
2014) most authors believe that this intention is merely frequently associated with lying. 
One prominent (but, we shall see, unsuccessful) argument against the idea that lying requires 
intending to deceive is the argument from knowledge-lies (Sorensen 2010), or lies that only 
attack certainty. Knowledge-lies aim to prevent the hearer from being certain of  the truth of  ¬p 
without intending him to believe that p . Consider an example: Pietro has won a lottery and is 14
ready to send his ticket to the address A1, to reclaim his prize. Luca wants to steal Pietro’s 
ticket, so he tells him that he believes that the correct address is A2 instead. He knows that 
this way Pietro will have to go to an Internet café to be sure that the address is indeed A1, and 
plans to steal the ticket in the meanwhile. This is a knowledge-lie because Luca has no 
intention to make Luca believe that the address is A2 (otherwise Pietro would send it to A2, 
and the plan would fail): he merely aims to undermine Pietro’s certainty (and knowledge) that 
the correct address is A1. 
According to the argument from knowledge-lies against the intention to deceive, (i) 
knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive, but since (ii) knowledge-lies are clearly lies, (iii) 
intending to deceive is not a necessary condition for lying. The problem with this argument is 
in premise (i), which holds only if  one endorses a very narrow account of  intended deception 
– one that includes attempts to make someone believe p, and excludes attempts to modify his 
degree of  belief  in p. However, it seems that intending to alter someone’s degree of  belief  
may count as intending to deceive him (Chisholm & Feehan 1977:145, Fallis 2009:45, but cf. 
Carson 2010:181), and consequently that (i) is false. In fact, there is an obvious sense in which 
knowledge-lies are intended to deceive (Staffel 2011, Fallis 2011): even if  Luca does not 
intend to make Pietro believe that the address is A2, it aims to undermine Pietro’s conviction 
that the address is not A2, thereby deceiving him.   
 Sorensen’s original definition is slightly broader: it captures any believed-false statement that aims “to prevent 14
the addressee from knowing that p is untrue” without intending him to believe that p, including statements that 
attack the hearer’s ground for believing (i.e.. epistemic certainty). However, since virtually every attack to 
epistemic certainty via lies is ultimately meant to attack psychological certainty (cf. Fallis 2011:360-4), I will again 
restrict the discussion to lies that attack psychological certainty.
The argument from knowledge-lies hence fails to prove that lying does not require intending 
to deceive, but it should not be concluded that intending to deceive is a necessary condition 
for lying (other compelling counterexamples still hold), nor that knowledge-lies are of  no 
interest for theorising about lying. On the contrary, knowledge-lies are remarkable in several 
respects. They effectively illustrate that manipulating the hearer can be more important than 
convincing him of  the truth of  the utterance, and that altering his degree of  belief  can be a 
powerful way to manipulate his behaviour: the lower somebody’s confidence in a belief, the 
lower their disposition to act on its basis. 
Knowledge-lies help us understanding the essence of  calumny, a common kind of  political 
knowledge-lie. Calumnies are lies that aim to undermine someone’s reputation. Often, 
calumnies work like knowledge lies: this happens when they merely aim to put into question 
someone’s reputation, without aiming to convince anybody that the propositional content of  
the calumny is true. Here is an example from Italian politics: during the 2011 Milan mayoral 
elections, Letizia Moratti claimed that her opponent Giuliano Pisapia had been condemned 
for stealing a van used to kidnap and beat a young man. Pisapia had indeed been accused of  
the crime in 1985, but he was also acquitted of  all charges. This calumny can be read as a 
knowledge-lie because it arguably did not aim to convince the electorate that Pisapia had 
committed the crime (a very difficult aim to achieve, given that all media quickly rectified 
Moratti’s statement), but rather to publicly put into question Pisapia’s criminal record, thus 
undermining the electorate’s certainty that Pisapia had never committed a crime . 15
Finally, lies that alter hearer certainty are interesting as they represent a further parameter 
that influences the “intensity” of  lies, that adds to the ones considered in the previous 
sections: the higher the expected epistemic damage, the more reprehensible the lie. 
This concludes the analysis of  the concept of  lying with respect to degrees of  certainty, that 
has identified three dimensions of  certainty that are relevant to lying: the speaker’s degree of  
certainty, the degree of  certainty expressed by the assertion, and the degree to which the 
speaker aims to modify hearer’s certainty. Only the last two are relevant to define lying, but all 
affect the relative ‘strength’ of  the lie. Lying can thus be considered a scalar phenomenon (a 
phenomenon that comes in degrees), with three dimensions of  gradability that are relevant to 
its evaluation from a linguistic, epistemic and ethical point of  view.  
 Cf. Poggi et al. (2011). Pisapia eventually won the elections.15
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